ABM Literature Review: Assayed et al. and Related College Admissions Simulation Papers
Source: abm_assayed_2024_notes.md
Overview
This document covers the body of agent-based modeling (ABM) research on college admissions, centered on Assayed's work (2023-2025) and the foundational Reardon et al. (2016) paper that most subsequent work builds upon.
1. Assayed & Al-Sayed (2025) — "Student Behaviors in College Admissions: A Survey of Agent-Based Models"
Full citation: Assayed, S. K. & Al-Sayed, S. (2025). Student Behaviors in College Admissions: A Survey of Agent-Based Models. International Journal of Emerging Multidisciplinaries: Computer Science & Artificial Intelligence, 4(1). DOI: 10.54938/ijemdcsai.2025.04.1.385
Also on SSRN: SSRN 5223687 (posted December 31, 2024)
Authors: Suha Khalil Assayed (The British University in Dubai, UAE) and Sana'a Alsayed (Philadelphia University, Jordan)
Indexed in: Crossref, Scopus, Google Scholar
What This Paper Is
A survey/review paper (not an original simulation). It catalogs and classifies ABM approaches used by international universities to study secondary education pathways and student behaviors in college admissions.
Key Themes
- Academic metrics (GPA, standardized tests) form the "cornerstone" of admission criteria, but behavioral dimensions (decision-making styles, personal aspirations, self-image) significantly influence student college selection.
- Social influences, access to advisory resources (school counselors), and awareness of the admissions process shape student choices.
- Marginalized populations face additional obstacles; ABMs can help universities "foster equitable practices."
- Some students aspire to elite universities while others, constrained by financial limitations or self-doubt, opt for less competitive institutions.
Keywords
Agent-Based Model, ABM, Agents, Behavior, Education, Equality, University, Simulation, Survey
Relevance to Our Simulation
This paper confirms the importance of modeling:
- Behavioral heterogeneity in application decisions (not just academic stats)
- Information asymmetry — students vary in how well they understand the admissions landscape
- SES-driven self-selection — low-resource students systematically under-apply
- Advisory access as a factor in application portfolio quality
2. Assayed & Maheshwari (2023a) — "Agent-Based Simulation for University Students Admission: Medical Colleges in Jordan Universities"
Full citation: Assayed, S. K. & Maheshwari, P. (2023). Agent-Based Simulation for University Students Admission: Medical Colleges in Jordan Universities. Computer Science & Engineering: An International Journal (CSEIJ), 13(1). February 2023.
Also available: BUID institutional repository, SSRN 4692509, ResearchGate
Model Description
- Platform: NetLogo v6.3
- Agent types:
- High School Students — attributes: high school GPA, family income
- Medical Colleges — attributes: reputation, seat capacity, cutoff GPA
- Parameters: family income (slider input), number of students, number of seats, number of colleges
- Mechanism: Students rank colleges by preference; colleges admit by GPA cutoff; income is tested as a priority variable
Key Findings
- When low-income, high-GPA students are prioritized over same-GPA higher-income students, college reputation becomes determined by cutoff GPA and student preferences rather than purely merit-based ranking.
- High-ranking universities are mainly allocated students with high cutoff GPA scores after multiple simulation rotations.
- Colleges most interested in attracting new students may not have the highest cutoff — cutoff marks are emergent from college experience across iterations.
Limitations
- Narrow scope: only medical colleges in Jordan (not US liberal arts / research university context)
- Only two student attributes (GPA + income) — no SAT, extracurriculars, essays, hooks
- No multi-round application process (ED/EA/RD)
- Simple preference-based matching, not utility-maximizing portfolio construction
- No validation against empirical enrollment data
Relevance to Our Simulation
- Demonstrates income-as-slider approach for testing equity scenarios
- Shows emergent college reputation from iterative simulation
- Our model is far more complex (8 archetypes, hooks, multi-round, 30+ attributes)
3. Assayed & Maheshwari (2023b) — "A Review of Agent-based Simulation for University Students Admission"
Full citation: Assayed, S. K. & Maheshwari, P. (2023). A Review of Agent-based Simulation for University Students Admission. Computer Science & Engineering: An International Journal (CSEIJ), 13(2). April 2023.
Also on SSRN: SSRN 4692455
What This Paper Is
A review article classifying several ABMs deployed by different admission offices from international universities. Models are classified by:
- Level of educational attainment modeled
- University selection behaviors
- Main simulation contribution
Key Takeaway
Very few studies have used agent-based models to study college sorting or admissions. The review confirms that Reardon et al. (2016) remains the most influential ABM in this space, with limited follow-up work.
4. Reardon, Kasman, Klasik & Baker (2016) — "Agent-Based Simulation Models of the College Sorting Process"
Full citation: Reardon, S. F., Kasman, M., Klasik, D. & Baker, R. (2016). Agent-Based Simulation Models of the College Sorting Process. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation (JASSS), 19(1), 8. https://www.jasss.org/19/1/8.html
Affiliation: Stanford CEPA (Center for Education Policy Analysis)
Model Architecture
Agent types:
1. Students — two core attributes:
- Resources (composite SES capital)
- Caliber (observable academic markers valued by colleges)
- Bivariate normal distribution with specified correlation (baseline r = 0.3)
2. Colleges — single quality attribute (= avg enrolled student caliber, recent years weighted more)
Three-stage process per year:
1. Application: Students estimate admission probabilities using perceived college quality and own caliber. Select portfolio to maximize expected utility. Higher-resource students submit more applications (baseline: 4 + 0.5 x resources).
2. Admission: Colleges rank applicants by observable caliber, admit enough to fill seats based on expected yield.
3. Enrollment: Students enroll at highest-perceived-utility institution. College quality updates for next cohort.
Key Parameters
| Parameter |
Baseline Value |
| Students |
8,000 |
| Colleges |
40 (150 capacity each) |
| Caliber distribution |
Normal, mean 1000, SD ~200 (SAT-scale) |
| Resource-caliber correlation |
0.3 |
| Information reliability |
0.7 base + 0.1 x resources (bounded 0.5-0.9) |
| Application enhancement |
0.1 x resources coefficient |
| Applications per student |
4 + 0.5 x resources |
| Iterations |
30 years to equilibrium |
| Data source |
ELS:2002 (nationally representative) |
Five SES Mechanisms Tested
- Resource-caliber correlation (achievement gap)
- Application enhancement (coaching, prep, polish)
- Information quality (knowledge of colleges and own chances)
- Number of applications (portfolio breadth)
- Differential valuation of college quality (how much students value selectivity)
Key Findings
- Resource-caliber correlation is dominant: Eliminating it reduces the probability differential between 90th and 10th percentile students for elite college enrollment from ~20x to ~4x.
- Four secondary mechanisms combined equal the correlation effect: Removing all four non-achievement pathways has about the same impact as removing the achievement gap alone.
- Application enhancement: Removing it decreased top-resource student selective college attendance by 6pp.
- Information quality: Eliminating disparities increased middle-distribution students' elite college access by 2pp.
- Application count: Weakening the resources-applications link particularly benefited lower-quartile students.
- College quality valuation: Minimal independent effect.
Limitations (as noted by authors)
- Stylized model — two attributes per student, one per college
- No financial aid, no hooks (legacy, athlete, URM), no essays
- No multi-round process (ED/EA/RD not modeled)
- No race/ethnicity dimension
- No social network effects in college choice
- 30-year equilibrium requirement may not reflect real dynamics
Relevance to Our Simulation
This is the foundational paper for our project. Our simulation extends Reardon in every dimension they identified as a limitation:
- We have 30+ student attributes (GPA, SAT, ECs, essays, hooks, demographics, income)
- 8 student archetypes with behavioral variation
- Multi-round process (ED, EA/REA, EDII, RD, waitlist)
- Financial aid and yield modeling
- Hook multipliers (athlete, legacy, donor, first-gen)
- Real college data (not stylized)
- Post-SFFA demographic considerations
5. Reardon, Baker, Kasman, Klasik & Townsend (2018) — Follow-up: SES-Based Affirmative Action Simulation
Full citation: Reardon, S. F., Baker, R. B., Kasman, M., Klasik, D. & Townsend, J. B. (2018). What Levels of Racial Diversity Can Be Achieved with Socioeconomic-Based Affirmative Action? Evidence from a Simulation Model. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 37(3), 630-657.
CEPA page: cepa.stanford.edu
Extension of the 2016 Model
Uses the same ABM framework from Reardon 2016 but adds race/ethnicity to examine whether SES-based affirmative action can substitute for race-based affirmative action.
Key Findings
- SES alone cannot match race-based policies for producing racial diversity at selective institutions.
- Combined SES-based AA + race-targeted recruiting can approach race-based AA outcomes, but is likely more expensive to implement.
- Spillover effects: Affirmative action adoption by some colleges reduces diversity at comparable-quality colleges without such policies.
- Academic matching: SES+recruiting approach produces fewer academically-overmatched Black and Hispanic students than race-based AA, but enrolled student academic achievement is also lower at schools using both policies.
Relevance to Our Simulation
Directly relevant to post-SFFA modeling. Our simulation could test SES-based priority scenarios similar to what Reardon 2018 explored, using our richer agent attributes and real college data.
6. Allard, Beziau & Gambs (2023/2026) — ReScience Replication
Full citation: Allard, T., Beziau, L. & Gambs, S. (2023). [Re] Simulating Socioeconomic-Based Affirmative Action. ReScience. HAL: hal-04328511
What This Is
A computational reproducibility study reimplementing the Reardon 2016/2018 model in Python. Confirms reproducibility of the original findings and provides an open-source Python implementation of the college sorting ABM.
Relevance
- Validates Reardon's model results hold under reimplementation
- Python codebase could be a reference for anyone wanting to compare implementations
- Focus on fairness and reproducibility in computational social science
7. Lee, Harvey, Zhou, Garg, Joachims & Kizilcec (2024) — ML-Based Admissions Decision Support
Full citation: Lee, J., Harvey, E., Zhou, J., Garg, N., Joachims, T. & Kizilcec, R. F. (2024). Algorithms for College Admissions Decision Support: Impacts of Policy Change and Inherent Variability. 4th ACM Conference on Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization (EAAMO '24), October 29-31, 2024, San Luis Potosi, Mexico. arXiv: 2407.11199
Affiliation: Cornell University
Not an ABM, but Highly Relevant
This paper uses ML ranking algorithms (not ABM) to study how policy changes affect admissions outcomes at a selective US university.
Key Findings
- Omitting race from consideration reduces the proportion of URM applicants in top-ranked pool by 62% — without increasing academic merit of that pool.
- Race omission reduces diversity more than omitting any other variable (test scores, intended major, etc.).
- Inherent arbitrariness: All admission policies contain substantial randomness; removing race increases outcome arbitrariness for most applicants.
- Test-optional: Limiting standardized test data further reduces predictive power.
Relevance to Our Simulation
Validates that our model's +-25% randomness term is realistic — even ML-based decision support shows substantial inherent variability. Also confirms that race/ethnicity is among the most consequential variables for admission outcomes, supporting our inclusion of demographic factors.
8. Summary Table: ABM Papers on College Admissions
| Paper |
Year |
Type |
Agents |
Scale |
Platform |
US Context? |
| Reardon et al. |
2016 |
Original ABM |
Students (2 attrs) + Colleges (1 attr) |
8K students, 40 colleges |
Custom |
Yes (stylized) |
| Reardon et al. |
2018 |
Extended ABM |
+ Race/ethnicity |
Same |
Custom |
Yes (stylized) |
| Assayed & Maheshwari |
2023a |
Original ABM |
Students (GPA, income) + Colleges |
Small scale |
NetLogo 6.3 |
No (Jordan) |
| Assayed & Maheshwari |
2023b |
Review |
N/A (survey) |
N/A |
N/A |
International |
| Assayed & Al-Sayed |
2025 |
Survey |
N/A (survey) |
N/A |
N/A |
International |
| Allard et al. |
2023 |
Replication |
Same as Reardon |
Same |
Python |
Yes (replication) |
| Lee et al. |
2024 |
ML ranking |
N/A (not ABM) |
Real univ. data |
ML pipeline |
Yes (real data) |
9. Gaps in the Literature That Our Simulation Fills
The literature review reveals several gaps that our college-sim project addresses:
- No existing ABM models the full US admissions cycle (ED/EA/REA/EDII/RD/waitlist) — Reardon uses a single application-admit-enroll round.
- No ABM includes hooks (legacy, athlete, donor, first-gen) as explicit agent attributes with calibrated multipliers.
- No ABM uses real institutional data — Reardon uses stylized colleges; Assayed uses Jordan medical schools.
- No ABM models post-SFFA dynamics with agent-level demographic attributes and income-based SAT offsets.
- No ABM models behavioral archetypes — existing work treats student decision-making as homogeneous (utility maximizing) rather than archetype-driven.
- No ABM incorporates yield modeling with income-bracket-specific yield rates (a la Chetty/Opportunity Insights).
- Financial aid and net cost are absent from all existing ABMs.
Our simulation is, to our knowledge, the most detailed agent-based model of US selective college admissions in the literature.
10. Key References for Further Reading
- Gale, D. & Shapley, L. S. (1962). College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage. American Mathematical Monthly, 69(1), 9-15.
- Avery, C., Hoxby, C., et al. — yield elasticity research ($1K grant ~ 11pp yield)
- Chetty, R. et al. — Opportunity Insights, 2.4M students x 139 colleges, yield x income x SAT x tier
- HSLS:09 — High School Longitudinal Study (application count calibration)
- ELS:2002 — Education Longitudinal Study (Reardon's data source)